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Nike may be able to “Just Do It” in California, but it can’t “Just 
Say It” anymore.  After Nike v. Kasky,1 statements made by a business 
enterprise are deemed to be commercial speech2 if they reach any 
potential consumer within the state of California.  Such 
commercial speech is accorded less First Amendment protection 
than that which is afforded to noncommercial speech.3  
 
†   J.D. candidate 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., English and 
Speech, Iowa State University, 1970; M.A., Theatre Arts, University of Minnesota, 
1975. 
 1. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003); see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002). 
 2. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247 (concluding that Nike’s “messages are 
commercial speech for purposes of applying state laws barring false and 
misleading commercial messages”). 
 3. Id.; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 
(1984) (finding that a noncommercial speaker’s statements criticizing a product 
1
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Consequently, Minnesota companies that do business in 
California—or that merely publish operational statements that may 
come into contact with a California consumer—have cause for 
concern: virtually all of a Minnesota company’s public utterances, 
including press releases and letters to the editor, are now 
considered to be advertising in California and are subject to 
prosecution under the state’s False Advertising Law.4 
Further, if the speech in question is alleged to be false or 
misleading, or if any true statements have the capacity to deceive or 
confuse the public, the speech will receive no First Amendment 
protection at all.5  Whereas advertising has traditionally been 
defined in America as speech that informs the public about “who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what 
price,”6 the commercial speech doctrine in California now defines 
advertising as any type of communication through which a 
corporation publicly releases information about its company, its 
products, its operations, or its values.7 
To complicate matters further, any California resident—
whether or not suffering personal harm—may bring action under 
the state’s unfair competition8 and false advertising9 laws against 
any business alleged to have made misleading or confusing 
statements about its company or products.10  While the speech of 
 
are noncommercial speech, for which damages may be awarded only upon proof 
of both falsehood and actual malice). 
 4. See generally Kasky, 45 P.3d at 253, 260-61 (holding that press releases and 
letters to the editor constituted advertising and thus were “commercial speech,” 
affording such speech a lower level of First Amendment protection). 
 5. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 250 (noting that this court has also recognized that 
“these laws prohibit ‘not only advertising which is false, but also advertising 
which[,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, 
likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public’”) (citing Leoni v. State 
Bar, 704 P.2d 183, 193-94 (Cal. 1985) (alteration in original)); see also id. at 261 
(noting that “commercial speech that is false or misleading receives no protection 
under the First Amendment”). 
 6. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 765 (1976). 
 7. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256-58. 
 8. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2003) (defining unfair competition as 
including any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice, or any unfair, 
deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising and stating that any act violating 
California’s false advertising law—Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500—necessarily 
violates the unfair competition law). 
 9. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (2003). 
 10. Id. (stating that it is unlawful to disseminate any statement in connection 
with an attempt to sell any real or personal property or service “which is untrue or 
misleading”).  See also Leoni, 704 P.2d at 193-94 (stating that true statements are 
2
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the individuals bringing such charges is given the highest level of 
protection under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,11 
companies under attack in California no longer are accorded the 
same level of protection.12  The Nike decision has thus created an 
unlevel playing field in First Amendment protections and threatens 
to chill corporate speech across America.13 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed in January 2003 to hear the 
Nike case under a writ of certiorari.14  Commentary on the case 
suggested that the real question was not whether the Court would 
overturn the California decision, but how resounding the reversal 
would be.15  Discussion centered on the need for the Court to 
clarify the definition of “commercial speech” in its decision, or 
possibly to do away with the distinction between commercial speech 
and fully protected speech altogether.16  Some First Amendment 
 
also prohibited if they are likely to confuse the public). 
 11. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 513 (requiring proof of both falsehood and 
actual malice). 
 12. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 250 (indicating that to state a claim under either the 
UCL or the False Advertising Law, “it is necessary only to show that ‘members of 
the public are likely to be deceived.’”) (citing Comm. on Children’s Television, 
Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal. 1983)); see also id. at 267-68 
(Chin, J., dissenting) (“The majority today refuses to honor a fundamental 
commitment and guarantee that both sides in a public debate may compete 
vigorously—and equally—in the marketplace of ideas . . . . I would give both sides 
in this important public controversy the full protection that our Constitution 
guarantees.”).  
 13. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003). 
That threat means a commercial speaker must take particular care—
considerably more than the speaker’s noncommercial opponents—
when speaking on public matters . . . . Uncertainty about how a court 
will view these, or other, statements, can easily chill a speaker’s efforts 
to engage in public debate—particularly where a “false advertising” 
law, like California’s law, imposes liability based upon negligence or 
without fault.  At the least, they create concern that the commercial 
speaker engaging in public debate suffers a handicap that 
noncommercial opponents do not.  
Id . (citations omitted). 
 14. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003). 
 15. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Nike v. Kasky: Will the Shield of the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine Become a Sword?, 20  COMM. LAW. 1, 30 (2003) (“[I]t is quite possible that 
the biggest question in the Kasky case is not whether the U.S. Supreme Court will 
reverse, but whether it will do so with a bang or a whimper.”). 
 16. See id. at 31 (speculating that the Court may be “willing to use the case to 
clarify the parameters of the commercial speech doctrine and to ensure . . . that 
the doctrine is not used as a weapon to silence one side of these public 
discussions”); see also Michelle Dobrusin, Note, Crass Commercialism: Is It Public 
Debate or Sheer Profit? The Controversy of Kasky v. Nike, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 1139, 1166 
(2003) (stating that “a review by the High Court will result in a clearer test so as to 
3
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experts considered the case to be “the most significant free-speech 
decision since [New York Times] v. Sullivan17 [in 1964].”18 
Thirty Amicus Curiae briefs were filed with the U.S. Supreme 
Court regarding the free speech issues at stake in Nike.19  The 
 
protect the rights of all speakers”). 
 17. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (establishing 
“actual malice” as the standard of proof which must be provided in order to 
recover damages for libel related to the official conduct of a public official).  In 
N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, the publication in question was not a “commercial” 
advertisement because it “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited 
grievances, protested claimed abuses . . . on behalf of a movement whose existence 
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.”  Id. at 266.  
The court further noted that discouraging newspapers from carrying editorial 
advertisements might “shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure ‘the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).  
 18. David Graulich, Press Release: Write in Haste . . . Repent, 26 NAT’L L.J. 8, Oct. 
14, 2002, at D12; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Nat’l Adver., Inc. et al., 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003), No. 02-575, 2003 WL 835112, at *1 
(U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) (“This case is one of the most important free speech cases to 
come before this Court since N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan . . . .”). 
 19. See Briefs of Amici Curiae, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 
02-575).  Twenty-one amici briefs were filed on behalf of Nike.  They were filed by: 
Center for Individual Freedom; Business Roundtable; Association of National 
Advertising, American Advertising Federation, American Association of 
Advertising Agencies; Center for the Advancement of Capitalism; Forty Leading 
Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-related 
Professional and Trade Associations (including ABC, Inc.; CBS Broadcasting, Inc.; 
The New York Times Company; U.S. News & World Report, L.P.; The Washington 
Post Co.); American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Northern California; The 
United States of America; Mountain States Legal Foundation; Pacific Legal 
Foundation, California Manufacturers and Technology Association, California 
Chamber of Commerce, New England Legal Foundation; National Association of 
Manufacturers; Pfizer, Inc.; Defenders of Property Rights, International Sign 
Association; SRiMedia, CoreRatings; Civil Justice Association of California; 
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, Media Institute; 
Arthur W. Page Society, Council of Public Relations Firms, Institute for Public 
Relations, Public Affairs Council, Public Relations Society of America; Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America; Civil Justice Association of California; 
Exxonmobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, Glaxosmithkline; Product Liability 
Advisory Council, Inc.; and Washington Legal Foundation, Allied Educational 
Foundation.  Eight briefs were filed in support of Kasky: Four Congressional 
Representatives (Dennis Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Corrine Brown, Bob Filner); 
Campaign Legal Center; National Association of Consumer Advocates; 
Reclaimdemocracy.com; Global Exchange; Domini Social Investments, KLD 
Research & Analytics, Harrington Investments; The Attorney General of 
California, joined by seventeen other state Attorneys General and the Secretary of 
Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and Public Citizen Litigation Group.  
One brief was filed for neither side but supported Nike on the First Amendment 
issue: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO). 
4
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Court, itself, was so interested in the case that it gave both sides an 
extra five minutes for oral arguments, extending the normal sixty 
minutes of argument to seventy minutes.20  Briefs were read, 
arguments were heard, and the Court did . . . nothing.  On June 26, 
2003, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its 6-3 decision to dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as “improvidently granted.”21  The Court 
decided not to decide and sent the case back to California for 
further proceedings.22  This non-decision sent shock waves through 
corporate America, public relations firms, the press, labor 
organizations, and the international corporate responsibility 
community.23 
Then things got worse.  Nike decided to settle, stating that it 
would rather spend its money on improving working conditions in 
its overseas factories than on legal fees.24  Kasky, meanwhile, was 
delighted that California got to keep its new commercial speech 
law.25 
 
 20. See Tony Mauro, Justices Get Nike out of Their Hair—For Now (March 1, 
2003), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=11653 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 21. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2554 (2003). 
 22. Id. at 2559. 
 23. See Theresa Howard, Advertisers Say Ruling Leaves Them in Limbo, USA 
TODAY, June 26, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/ 
2003-06-26-nikeside_x.htm (quoting Douglas Wood, general counsel to the 
Association of National Advertisers: “From an advertisers’ standpoint, it’s the worst 
of both worlds . . . . This case now says everything a business says relative to 
controversy, but not part of a commercial transaction, is subject to (being ruled) 
false and deceptive speech.”); see also Graulich, supra note 18 (stating that lawyers 
must now challenge their public relations colleagues to decide “whether the 
potential marketing gains of a [press] release justify the inevitable litigation 
risks”); Peter Clarke, Analysis: California Supreme Court Decision Potentially Devastating 
for Corporate Responsibility Reporting and SRI Funds Worldwide, ETHICAL CORPORATION 
ONLINE, Oct. 17, 2002, available at http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp? 
ContentID=242; (“The California decision is devastating to the efforts of the 
media, NGO’s, [and] CSR consultancy firms . . . that encourage corporate 
transparency in many ways, including engagement with multi-national enterprises 
on corporate social responsibility issues.”); Even Fibs: The First Amendment’s Far 
Reach, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Sept. 19, 2003, at A22 (editorializing that the 
danger of limiting corporate free speech as a result of the Nike decision is worth 
worrying about: “[W]hile some firms definitely deserve to be challenged for their 
behavior, they deserve as well the chance to defend themselves . . . . They can’t do 
so if every public pronouncement is judged to be advertising”). 
 24. See Press Release, Nike, Inc., Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of 
Kasky v. Nike First Amendment Case (Sept. 12, 2003), at http://www.nike.com/ 
nikebiz/news/pressrelease.jhtml?year=2003&month=09&letter=f (last visited Apr. 
19, 2004). 
 25. See Lisa Girion, Nike Settles Suit over Sweatshop Statements, STAR TRIBUNE 
5
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The concern is, indeed, that a California law thought to be not 
only bad, but unconstitutional,26 remains alive and well.  The 
potentially devastating impact of the law derives from the fact that 
the California economy is the fifth-largest economy in the world.27  
In a technological economy, most companies cannot do business 
without touching a California consumer.28  And, under California 
law, it takes only one California consumer to press a costly and 
hostile lawsuit against any company inside or outside the state.29 
To explore the full impact of the California and U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions in Nike, it is necessary to understand the curious 
transmogrification of free speech tenets in America.  This note will 
examine the history and changes in commercial speech doctrine 
that have occurred during the twentieth century.30  The note will 
then review both the California Kasky decision31 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court Nike decision,32 presenting an analysis of the 
ramifications of those decisions on corporate speech, public 
accessibility to information, and free and open debate.33  Finally, 
the note will conclude that these judicial decisions, themselves, are 
improvident.34  At a time when the country is striving for more 
reporting, more corporate disclosure, and more corporate 
accountability,35 decisions that muzzle corporate information- 
 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 13, 2002, at D10 (quoting Kasky’s lawyer, Patrick Coughlin: 
“We get to keep the California Supreme Court decision, which we think is 
fabulous.”). 
 26. See Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2568 (Breyer & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (“[I]t 
is . . . highly probable that, if this Court were to reach the merits, it would hold 
that the heightened scrutiny applies; that . . . California’s delegation of 
enforcement authority to private attorneys general disproportionately burdens 
speech; and that the First Amendment consequently forbids it.”).  
 27. See Clarke, supra note 23. 
 28. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (2003) (adding in 1998 the phrase 
“including over the Internet” as a prohibited means of dissemination of false 
advertising to California residents). 
 29. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (2003) (allowing actions to be 
prosecuted “upon the complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation, or 
association or by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the 
general public”).  This is commonly known as California’s “private attorney 
general” law.  See CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, SHAKEDOWN IN “THE GOLDEN 
STATE,” at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legal_issues/legal_activities/policy_ 
papers/california_u_c_l.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 30. See infra Part II. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
 33. See infra Parts V-VII. 
 34. See infra Part VIII. 
 35. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (requiring 
6
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sharing through draconian restrictions on First Amendment rights 
of free speech clearly lack foresight. 
II. THE TRANSMOGRIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Before 1942, “commercial speech” did not exist.  Almost all 
forms of speech were thought to be protected by the First 
Amendment.36 Commercial speech was invented by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen,37 a case involving a 
businessman’s attempt to circumvent the New York Sanitary Code.  
In this case, an enterprising fellow named Valentine hauled a 
former U.S. Navy submarine from Florida to New York, hoping to 
charge admission for tours of the submarine at a city dock.38  After 
Valentine was denied wharfage at a city pier, he docked the 
submarine at a state pier in the East River and distributed handbills 
advertising the exhibit.39  Police Commissioner Chrestensen then 
intervened, citing prohibition under the city’s Sanitary Code of the 
distribution of advertising matter “in or upon any street or public 
place.”40  Valentine was apprised, however, that he might freely 
distribute handbills that were devoted to “information or a public 
protest.”41  Valentine thereupon printed a new handbill with his 
submarine ad on one side and a protest against his denial of a city 
wharfage permit on the other.42  Chrestensen sued, contending that 
Valentine was merely attempting to circumvent the city statute.43  
The suit eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
decided against Valentine.44 
The question before the Court was whether the enforcement 
of the ordinance was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom 
of the press and freedom of speech.45  The Court determined that 
 
more transparent reporting by American corporations, greater financial 
disclosure, and independent audit and accounting functions). 
 36. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 37. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52 (1942). 
 38. Id. at 52-53. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 53. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 54. 
 44. Id. at 55. 
 45. Id. at 54. 
7
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the ordinance could be applied against Valentine, as it was “clear 
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as 
respects purely commercial advertising.”46  The Court did not 
explain just where or how it discovered this special category of 
unprotected “commercial” speech.47  The Court made no mention 
of prior case law or of the Constitution in arriving at its 
determination.48  Indeed, the commercial speech doctrine seemed 
to be “plucked out of thin air.”49  Thus emerged a separate category 
of speech that received no constitutional protection whatsoever.50 
Commercial speakers languished without First Amendment 
protection for more than thirty years.  It was not until the landmark 
case of Bigelow v. Virginia51 in 1975 that the Court restored some 
protection to commercial speech.  The Bigelow Court determined 
that such speech was, indeed, protected by the First Amendment—
although at a lesser level than non-commercial speech.52  The 
Court held that a balancing test should be applied by courts in 
commercial advertising cases to assess “the First Amendment 
interest at stake . . . weighing it . . . against the public interest 
allegedly served by the regulation.”53 
In 1976, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy54 made an 
even stronger case for First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech, recognizing that a speaker’s commercial interest should 
not be dispositive in determining whether speech is commercial.55  
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he [Valentine] ruling was casual, almost offhand.”).  
 48. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52. 
 49. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 627, 627 (1990). 
 50. See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513-14 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing 
Valentine v. Chrestensen as holding that “business advertisements and commercial 
matters did not enjoy that protection of the First Amendment, made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth”). 
 51. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 809 (1975). 
 52. Id. at 818 (“Our cases . . . clearly establish that speech is not stripped of 
First Amendment protection merely because it appears [as a paid commercial 
advertisement] . . . . The fact that the particular advertisement . . . had commercial 
aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First 
Amendment guarantees.”) (citations omitted). 
 53. Id. at 826. 
 54. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 748 (1976) (holding that a Virginia regulation prohibiting the 
advertising of prescription drug prices is void and of no effect; that commercial 
speech is protected under the First Amendment). 
 55. Id. at 762 (stating that assuming “the advertiser’s interest is a purely 
8
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The Court noted that commercial speech should receive protection 
in order to promote the free marketplace of ideas, providing 
information to the public so that decisions may be made by an 
intelligent and well-informed populace.56  However, the Court also 
created a hierarchy of protected speech by determining that 
commercial speech was not equivalent to political or even artistic 
speech.57  The Court rationalized that commercial speech needs 
less protection than other types of speech because it is more easily 
verifiable by its disseminator than news reporting or political 
commentary; that it is more durable than other kinds of speech 
due to commercial companies’ dependence on advertising to reap 
profits; and that commercial speech, therefore, is less likely to be 
“chilled” by proper regulation than other types of speech.58 
By this time, the Valentine decision had been virtually 
abandoned.  Even Justice Douglas, who sat on the Valentine Court 
and concurred in that opinion, agreed that the ruling had “not 
survived reflection.”59  Commercial speech was clearly to be 
protected.  However, it was not so easily defined. 
In 1973, the Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission 
on Human Relations60 defined commercial speech as speech that 
does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”61  In 1980, 
the Central Hudson Gas & Electric, Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York62 Court determined that commercial speech was 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”63  In 1983, the Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp.64 Court developed a test establishing three elements, at least 
 
economic one,” the economic interest “hardly disqualifies him from protection 
under the First Amendment”). 
 56. Id. at 765. 
 57. See id. at 772. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 60. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376 (1973). 
 61. Id. at 385. 
 62. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 561 (1980) (holding that “promotional advertising of electricity might 
contribute to society’s interest in informed and reliable economic 
decisionmaking” and that “the governmental interest in the prohibition [did not] 
outweigh[] the . . . constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that a 
statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisement for contraceptives 
9
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two of which needed to be present to support a finding of 
commercial speech: the speech (1) must be in the form of an 
advertisement, (2) must refer to a specific product, and (3) must 
show that the speaker has an economic motivation.65  The Pittsburgh 
Press, Central Hudson, and Bolger definitions of commercial speech 
continued to exist concurrently until Nike, creating confusion and 
eliciting requests for one clear, workable definition of commercial 
speech.66 
In addition to the confusion over the definition of commercial 
speech, the issue of government regulation was also a cause for 
concern as the commercial speech doctrine evolved.  Content-
based regulation of noncommercial speech was generally thought 
to be valid under the First Amendment only if it could withstand 
strict scrutiny; that is, the law required that the regulation be 
narrowly tailored to use only the least restrictive means possible to 
promote or compel the government’s interest in restricting the 
speech.67  However, there was no established law regarding 
government regulation of commercial speech until the Central 
Hudson ruling in 1980.68 
In Central Hudson, the Court articulated an intermediate 
scrutiny test for commercial speech by establishing a four-part 
analysis.69  Under Central Hudson, the first step in the analysis was to 
determine whether the speech concerned lawful activity and was 
not misleading.70  If the commercial speech did not pass this 
preliminary threshold, then it was not protected by the First 
Amendment.71  If the commercial expression did pass the 
 
violates the First Amendment). 
 65. Id. at 66-68. 
 66. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 
835350, at *2 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) (“For many years, the Court has sent conflicting 
signals on the definition of ‘commercial speech’ and has allowed the lower courts 
to take divergent approaches on this issue.”); see also id. at *3 (noting that the 
Court’s “authoritative guidance on the definition of ‘commercial speech’ is much 
needed . . .”) see also Fisher, supra note 15, at 30 (stating that the Court should 
finally “issue a clear definition of commercial speech”). 
 67. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (citing United States 
v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, (2000); Consol. Edison Co. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)). 
 68. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). 
 69. Id. at 566. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 434 (1993) 
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preliminary threshold, then the government was required to show 
(1) that the asserted governmental interest in regulating the 
expression was “substantial,” (2) that the regulation at issue directly 
advanced that interest, and (3) that the regulation was not more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.72  Although meant to 
clarify the commercial speech doctrine, the result of the Central 
Hudson decision was to generate even more confusion and 
commentary regarding just what types of regulation the four-part 
test permitted.73 
The last part of the Central Hudson test—requiring that the 
regulation imposed be no more extensive than necessary to serve 
the governmental interest—was clarified by Board of Trustees of State 
University of New York v. Fox74 in 1989.  The Fox Court determined 
that the intermediate scrutiny test does not require the least 
restrictive means of enforcement, but only a “reasonable fit” 
between the government’s purpose and the means chosen to 
achieve it.75 
Throughout this transmutation of the commercial speech 
doctrine, there were signs of uneasiness on the Court.  Justice 
Stevens expressed his concern in a separate concurring opinion in 
Bolger that the Court was creating the impression that commercial 
speech “is a fairly definite category of communication that is 
 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 72. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 73. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 49, at 631 (“[E]ver since [Central 
Hudson], judges and Justices have filled quite a bit of space . . . trying to figure out 
precisely what forms of regulation the four-part test permits . . . . Unless a case has 
facts very much like those of a prior case, it is nearly impossible to predict the 
winner.”); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 34 (2000) (noting that the Central Hudson test “has subsequently 
been interpreted from radically different perspectives, and although it has been 
attacked by numerous justices, it has nevertheless remained the dominant test” 
(citations omitted)).  See also id. at 1 (noting that the test is “abstract and 
unhelpful, because it does not reflect any particular account of the constitutional 
function of commercial speech”). 
 74. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (declining to 
impose a “least-restrictive means” requirement on government regulation of 
commercial speech; requiring the state to affirmatively establish a “reasonable 
fit”). 
 75. Id. at 480 (stating that the Court requires a “fit” between “the legislature’s 
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.”  The fit does not have to 
be “perfect,” but “reasonable.”  It should represent “not necessarily the single best 
disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served.’ ”  It need 
not employ the least restrictive means but a means “narrowly tailored to achieve 
the desired objective” (citations omitted)). 
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protected by a fairly definite set of rules that differ from those 
protecting other categories of speech.”76  Moreover, Justice Stevens 
expressed his concern that the establishment of “rigid 
classifications” might inadvertently suppress speech entitled to 
constitutional protection.77  Then, anticipating the next topic of 
debate in commercial speech evolution, Justice Stevens broached 
the issue of mixed speech, noting that “advertisements may be 
complex mixtures of commercial and noncommercial 
elements . . . .”78 
The issue of mixed speech was considered by the Court in Riley 
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.79 and Fox80 in 
1988 and 1989, respectively.  The essence of the two cases was that 
the Court did not believe that speech retains its commercial 
character when the commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined 
with otherwise fully protected speech.”81  To determine the degree 
of scrutiny to be applied, the nature of the speech taken as a whole 
must be considered, without parceling out the speech and applying 
one test to one phrase and another test to another.82  Therefore, in 
cases of inextricably intertwined speech, the speech is considered 
to be noncommercial and the Court will apply the test for fully 
protected speech.83 
Recent commercial speech decisions have found members of 
the Court questioning the efficacy of trying to separate commercial 
from noncommercial speech, as well as the validity of the 
distinction itself.84  Through its long and difficult history, the 
 
 76. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988) 
(holding that statutory fee limitations, disclosures, and licenses for professional 
fundraisers unconstitutionally infringed upon freedom of speech). 
 80. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that 
governmental restrictions upon commercial speech need not be the absolute least 
restrictive means to achieve the desired end). 
 81. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “the near impossibility of severing ‘commercial’ 
speech from speech necessary to democratic decisionmaking”); see also United 
Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 
1998) (citing Thomas’ concurring opinion in Liquormart and stating that “[t]he 
current debate centers not on whether commercial speech is a form of expression 
entitled to constitutional protection, but on the validity of the distinction between 
12
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evolution of commercial speech has been a contentious 
undertaking, viewed by some as the most divisive realm of First 
Amendment law.85  Consequently, legal scholars eagerly anticipated 
the resolution of the Nike case in 2003, hoping that the Court 
would bring some long-sought clarity to the commercial speech 
doctrine. 
III. THE CALIFORNIA CASE: KASKY V. NIKE, INC. 
The underlying suit in the Nike case was brought as a result of 
Nike’s response to a series of allegations that it was mistreating and 
underpaying workers in foreign facilities.  As part of a worldwide 
campaign against economic globalization, Nike was targeted by a 
group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)86 in a broad and 
noisy protest against Nike’s overseas labor practices.87  The NGOs 
capitalized on a series of reports presented by Vietnam Labor 
Watch, which conducted interviews with thirty-five of Nike’s 
300,000 to 500,000 workers employed in Asian factories; and the 
Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, which studied several 
Chinese factories, three of which were used by Nike.88  These 
reports were picked up by American media, resulting in widespread 
public scrutiny and culminating in a series of eight articles in The 
New York Times during 1996 and 1997, as well as a critical report on 
 
commercial and noncommercial speech”); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (Stevens, J., writing for the majority, 
joined by O’Connor, J., Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.) (“This very case 
illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial 
speech in a distinct category.”). 
 85. See Post, supra note 73, at 2. 
 86. See BOYCOTT NIKE, at http://www.saigon.com/~nike/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (listing Nike protest organizations as: Press for Change, the 
National Labor Committee, Global Exchange, Campaign for Labor Rights, 
National Organization of Women, Clean Clothes Campaign, Community Aid 
Abroad, The Living Wage Project, Justice Do It Nike, and several other NGOs).  
See also Living with the Enemy, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1975902 (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (“NGOs are increasingly pursuing their campaigns within 
America’s notoriously plaintiff-friendly legal system, with its potential for huge 
payouts.”). 
 87. See Sweatshops, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, at http://www.globalexchange.org/ 
campaigns/sweatshops/nike/faq.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (asking, “Why 
pick on Nike, if other shoe companies are just as bad?” and answering, “Nike is the 
biggest shoe company in the world and puts itself forth as an industry leader . . . . 
By targeting the industry leader, we hoped to make changes throughout the whole 
industry”). 
 88. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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the CBS television show 48 Hours.89  Additionally, NGO websites 
posted information designed to encourage students to conduct 
anti-Nike campaigns on their college campuses, to pass city 
resolutions against Nike, to conduct letters-to-the-editor campaigns, 
and to engage in Nike boycotts.90 
None of the allegations against Nike referred to Nike’s 
products.91  Rather, the charges were that Nike “was an immoral 
company, generating great profits on the backs of Third World 
Labor.”92  The charges of moral irresponsibility were coupled with 
demands for consumer boycotts and legislative action against 
Nike.93 
Nike responded to the public outcry with its own public 
relations campaign.94  The company commissioned former United 
Nations Ambassador Andrew Young to conduct an independent 
review of its overseas operations and issued a number of press 
releases responding to the sweatshop allegations.95  The press 
releases denied exploitation of underage workers, outlined the 
company’s code of conduct, and responded to charges regarding 
its labor practices with detailed information and footnoted 
sources.96  Nike also sent a letter to the presidents and athletic 
directors of colleges sponsoring Nike products, defending its labor 
practices.97  Additionally, Nike officials sent a letter to the editor of 
 
 89. Id. at 856-57. 
 90. See Campaign Starter Kit, Global Exchange, at http://www.globalexchange. 
org/campaigns/sweatshops/nike/actnow.html.pf (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 91. Brief for Petitioner, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (No. 02-575) 2003 WL 898993 at 
*2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (2000). 
 95. Id. at 856. 
 96. Id. at 857. 
 97. Id.  See also Tony Mauro, High Court Appears Ready to Side with Nike in Free-
Speech Dispute, First Amendment Topics (Apr. 24, 2003), at  http://www. 
firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=11384&SearchString=kasky (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (indicating that this letter, directed to athletic directors who 
may purchase Nike products, was later referred to in the U.S. Supreme Court oral 
arguments as the document that came the closest to commercial speech).  See 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2570-71 (2003) for the text of the letter: 
June 18, 1996 
Dear President and Director of Athletics, 
As most of you have probably read, heard, or seen, NIKE, Inc. has 
recently come under attack from the Made in the USA Foundation and 
other labor organizers, who claim that child labor is used in the 
production of its goods.  While you may also be aware that NIKE has 
14
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The New York Times in response to its series of critical articles.98 
 
gone on the record to categorically deny these allegations as 
completely false and irresponsible, I would like to extend the courtesy 
of providing you with many of the facts that have been absent from the 
media discourse on this issue.  I hope you will find this information 
useful in discussions with faculty and students who may be equally 
disturbed by these charges. 
First and foremost, wherever NIKE operates around the globe, it is 
guided by principles set forth in a code of conduct that holds its 
production subcontractors to a signed Memorandum of 
Understanding.  This Memorandum strictly prohibits child labor, and 
certifies compliance with applicable government regulations regarding 
minimum wage and overtime, as well as occupational health and safety, 
environmental regulations, worker insurance and equal opportunity 
provisions. 
NIKE enforces its standards through daily observation by staff members 
who are responsible for monitoring adherence to the Memorandum.  
NIKE currently employs approximately 800 staff members in Asia alone 
to oversee operations.  Every NIKE subcontractor knows that the 
enforcement of the Memorandum includes systematic, unannounced 
evaluation by third-party auditors.  These thorough reviews include 
interviews with workers, examination of safety equipment and 
procedures, review of free health-care facilities, investigation of worker 
grievances and audits of payroll records. 
Furthermore, over the past 20 years we have established long-term 
relationships with select subcontractors, and we believe that our sense 
of corporate responsibility has influenced the way they conduct their 
business.  After all, it is incumbent upon leaders like NIKE to ensure 
that these violations do not occur in our subcontractor’s [sic] factories. 
We have found over the years that, given the vast area of our 
operations and the difficulty of policing such a network, some 
violations occur.  However, we have been proud that in all material 
respects the code of conduct is complied with.  The code is not just 
word.  We live by it.  NIKE is proud of its contribution in helping to 
build economies, provide skills, and create a brighter future for 
millions of workers around the world. 
As a former Director of Athletics, and currently the Director of Sports 
Marketing at NIKE, I am indeed sensitive to these issues.  I would be 
more than happy to make myself available to either discuss these issues 
and/or receive any opinions or insights you may have.  We are 





NIKE Sports Marketing 
Id. 
 98. See Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.  See also The Associated Press, Supreme 
Court Punts Commercial-Speech Case, First Amendment Topics (June 26, 2003), at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=11648 (last visited Apr. 19, 
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Enter Marc Kasky, a San Francisco community activist,99 who 
had read about Nike’s labor practices and decided to file a lawsuit 
against Nike under California’s Unfair Competition and False 
Advertising Laws.100  Kasky obtained the support of a “powerhouse” 
law firm reputed to fuel its success by “filing lawsuits against multi-
national corporations and receiving massive fees out of any 
settlements or judgments.”101  Kasky was able to file the suit on 
behalf of the general public of the State of California102 as a private 
citizen alleging “no harm or damages whatsoever regarding himself 
individually”103 under California’s unique private attorney general 
law.104 Unlike other states, where the state’s elected Attorney 
General must file similar complaints, California allows any citizen 
under section 17204 of its Unfair Competition Law (UCL) to file a 
complaint in the interest of the general public.105 
In his complaint, Kasky contended that Nike had made 
“misrepresentations by the use of false statements and/or material 
omissions of fact,” in seven specific statements contained in its 
“ubiquitous and successful promotional scheme.”106  Kasky sought, 
among other things, (a) an injunction ordering Nike to disgorge 
all monies earned through any unlawful and/or unfair business 
practice, (b) an order for Nike to undertake a court-approved 
public information campaign to correct any misleading or deceitful 
statements, and (c) attorneys’ fees and costs.107 
 
2004) (indicating that Nike sent a letter to the editor of The New York Times, 
submitted press releases, and  posted information on its corporate Web site). 
 99. See NIKE Sued Over Sweatshop Conditions, SweatshopWatch.Org (Apr. 20, 
1998) at http://sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/headlines/1998/nikesued_apr98. 
html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (stating that Kasky was a high-profile activist, fresh 
from a settlement in the lawsuit that outlawed Joe Camel). 
 100. See Clarke, supra note 23. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive 
Relief (Apr. 20, 1998), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/PRT.jsp? 
articleid=3448 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (2003). 
 105. Id. See also Mauro, supra note 97 (“California consumer-protection laws 
allow ‘unelected, unaccountable private enforcers’ to sue companies at 
random . . . . [A]nyone with a whim or grievance against a company could become 
a ‘government-licensed censor.’ ”) (quoting Solicitor General Theodore Olson, 
arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court on Nike’s behalf). 
 106. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive 
Relief (Apr. 20, 1998), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/PRT.jsp? 
articleid=3448 (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). 
 107. Id. 
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The California trial court dismissed the suit, agreeing with 
Nike’s demurrer to the complaint contending that the suit was 
absolutely barred by the First Amendment.108  The appeals court 
agreed, stating that “the case at bar lies in familiar First 
Amendment territory—public dialogue on a matter of public 
concern.  Though drafted in terms of commercial speech, the 
complaint in fact seeks judicial intervention in a public debate.”109  
The appeals court concluded that Nike’s press releases and letters 
were part of a public dialogue on a matter of public concern 
“within the core area of expression protected by the First 
Amendment.”110 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, 
reversed the lower courts, holding that Nike’s messages were 
“directed by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience” and 
“made representations of fact about the speaker’s own business 
operations for the purposes of promoting sales of its products.”111  
The messages therefore were “commercial speech for purposes of 
applying state laws barring false and misleading commercial 
messages.”112     The California Supreme Court then sent the case 
back to the lower courts to determine if, in fact, any of Nike’s 
statements was false or misleading.113 
Three justices dissented, with Justices Chin and Brown 
providing lengthy and vigorous rejections of the majority 
opinion.114  Both justices (and Justice Baxter, concurring with 
Justice Chin) concluded that Nike’s press releases, letters to the 
 
 108. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (2000) (stating that the 
trial court “regarded the constitutional distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech to be dispositive”). 
 109. Id. at 860.  The appeals court went on to say: 
Nike exemplifies the perceived evils or benefits of labor practices 
associated with the processes of economic globalization . . . . Nike’s 
strong corporate image . . . places its labor practices in the context of a 
broader debate about the social implications of employing low-cost 
foreign labor for manufacturing functions once performed by 
domestic workers.  We take judicial notice that this debate has given 
rise to urgent calls for action ranging from international labor 
standards to consumer boycotts.  Information about the labor practices 
at Nike’s overseas plants thus constitutes data relevant to a controversy 
of great public interest in our times. 
Id. at 861. 
 110. Id. at 863. 
 111. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 262-63. 
 114. Id. at 263-80. 
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editor, and other communications concerning the attacks on its 
labor practices were not commercial speech and were deserving of 
full First Amendment protection.115  Justice Chin also noted the 
inequitable playing field created by the California ruling, 
concluding that “[h]andicapping one side in the important 
worldwide debate is both ill considered and unconstitutional.” 116 
Justice Brown concluded that the commercial elements in 
Nike’s statements were “inextricably intertwined” with its 
noncommercial elements.117  She criticized the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s inability to define the elements of commercial speech,118 
contending that “the commercial speech doctrine, in its current 
form, fails to account for the realities of the modern world—a 
world in which personal, political, and commercial arenas no 
longer have sharply defined boundaries.”119  Justice Brown then 
called on the high court to develop “a more nuanced approach 
that maximizes the ability of businesses to participate in the public 
debate while minimizing consumer fraud.”120 
Nike filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, 
requesting that the Court hear the case without further intervening 
proceedings.  The two questions to be decided were (a) whether 
the speech of a corporation participating in a public debate could 
be properly characterized as commercial speech, and (b) whether 
the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, permitted speakers to be subjected to the 
“legal regime” in California which allows any unharmed, private 
citizen to sue on behalf of the general public.121 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 263.  Justice Chin also noted: 
Various persons and organizations have accused Nike of engaging in 
despicable practices, which they have described sometimes with such 
caustic and scathing words as “slavery” and “sweatshop.”  Nike’s critics 
and these accusations receive full First Amendment protection . . . . 
When Nike tries to defend itself from these attacks, the majority denies 
it the same First Amendment protection Nike’s critics enjoy. Why is 
this, according to the majority?  Because Nike competes not only in the 
marketplace of ideas, but also in the marketplace of manufactured 
goods. 
  Id. 
 117. Id. at 269. 
 118. Id. at 268-69. 
 119. Id. at 269. 
 120. Id. at 270. 
 121. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2555 (2003). 
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IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE: NIKE, INC. V. KASKY 
The U.S. Supreme Court did not answer the questions 
presented to it in the writ, nor did it decide the Nike case on its 
merits.  Instead, the Court dismissed the case on procedural 
grounds, issuing an unsigned one-sentence statement: “The writ of 
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.”122  Although such 
procedural dismissal is not uncommon—the same statement has 
been used to dismiss cases accepted upon a writ of certiorari 
approximately seventy-five times since 1945123—the Court’s decision 
surprised commentators attending the oral arguments, who felt 
that Nike had won.124   
Also surprising was the fact that lengthy opinions were issued 
on both sides of the controversy.125  Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Souter wrote that the case was not properly before the Court and 
that dismissal was therefore warranted.126  Justices Breyer, 
O’Connor, and Kennedy wrote in dissent, stating that the Court 
should have rendered a decision on the merits.127  The three 
remaining Justices remained silent but joined in the decision to 
dismiss. 
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter) 
determined that the Court had three valid reasons for its decision 
to dismiss the writ: (1) the judgment entered by the California 
Supreme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
section 1257; (2) neither party had standing in federal court; and 
(3) the Court was averse to “premature adjudication of novel 
constitutional questions.”128 
Justice Breyer (joined by Justice O’Connor) disagreed 
regarding all three reasons for dismissal, asserting the existence of 
 
 122. Id. at 2554. 
 123. See Westlaw Search for Supreme Court cases after 1944: “writ of certiorari 
is dismissed as improvidently granted.” 
 124. See Mauro, supra note 97 (“At the end of 70 minutes of oral argument 
yesterday, the Supreme Court appeared ready to agree that under the First 
Amendment, Nike should not be subjected to a lawsuit by California activist Marc 
Kasky . . . .”).  See also id. (quoting First Amendment Center scholar Ronald Collins 
as saying “[i]f they get through the jurisdictional thicket, I think Nike wins”). 
 125. Of the last twenty cases dismissed because the “writ of certiorari was 
improvidently granted,” only five cases, including Nike, have included a written 
opinion.  The other fifteen cases provided no reasoning for the Court’s decision 
and no opinion. 
 126. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2554. 
 127. Id. at 2559. 
 128. See id. at 2555. 
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a clear constitutional issue that demanded resolution.129  Further, 
the dissenting judges contended that the Court’s delay in issuing a 
decision on the underlying free speech issues would impose a 
serious burden upon speech130 and would “limit the supply of 
relevant information available to those, such as journalists, who 
seek to keep the public informed about important public issues.”131 
In the dissent, Justice Breyer also opined that the 
communications at issue, as in Riley, were best characterized as a 
mixture of commercial and noncommercial speech.132  He focused 
particularly on Nike’s letter to university presidents and athletic 
directors133 as containing several commercial elements, thereby 
serving as the Nike document least likely to warrant protection.134  
However, Justice Breyer noted, the letter also contained substantial 
noncommercial characteristics: it appeared outside a traditional 
advertising format, it did not propose the sale of a product or any 
other commercial transaction, and on its face it sought to provide 
information to a “diverse audience” regarding the public 
controversy surrounding Nike.135  As these noncommercial 
characteristics were “inextricably intertwined” with the commercial 
characteristics, the speech did not represent core commercial 
speech and should be afforded full First Amendment protection.136 
Further, Justice Breyer concluded that the regulatory regime 
in California—involving the use of private attorneys general to 
press false advertising lawsuits—could not survive heightened 
scrutiny in the matter.137  The Justice noted that “there is no 
 
 129. See id. at 2562 (“No federal statute prevents us from hearing this case . . . . 
[T]his Court has interpreted the . . . phrase ‘final judgment’ to refer . . . to a state 
court’s final determination of a federal issue, even if the determination of that 
issue occurs in the midst of ongoing litigation.”); see also id. at 2563 (stating that 
“[t]he California Supreme Court [has] ‘finally decided’ the federal issue—
whether the First Amendment protects the speech in question from legal attack on 
the ground that it is ‘false or misleading’ ”). 
 130. Id. at 2560 (noting that the issues in question “directly concern the 
freedom of Americans to speak about public matters in public debate,” that “no 
jurisdictional rule prevents us from deciding those questions now,” and that “delay 
itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech 
without making the issue significantly easier to decide later on”). 
 131. Id. at 2568. 
 132. See id. at 2565. 
 133. See text of letter, supra note 97. 
 134. See Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2565. 
 135. Id. at 2565-66. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 2566. 
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reasonable ‘fit’ between the burden it imposes upon speech and 
the important governmental ‘interest served.’ ”138  “The delegation 
of state authority to private individuals authorizes a purely 
ideological plaintiff, convinced that his opponent is not telling the 
truth, to bring into the courtroom the kind of political battle better 
waged in other forums.”139 
Justice Breyer concluded that it was likely, if not highly 
probable, that if the Court were to reach a decision on the merits 
of the Nike case, it would hold that California’s delegation of 
enforcement authority to private attorneys general is 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.140  Additionally, 
Justice Breyer speculated that reversal of the California Supreme 
Court on the federal issue of commercial speech would be a serious 
possibility.141 
After the case was dismissed and sent back to California for 
further proceedings, the parties decided to settle out of court.142  In 
the settlement, Nike agreed to contribute $1.5 million to the Fair 
Labor Association,143 a consortium of companies, universities, and 
NGOs promoting respect for labor rights.144  Nike also agreed to 
maintain its existing funding at a minimum of $500,000 over the 
next two years to continue its after-hours worker education 
programs and micro-loan programs.145  The law firm representing 
Kasky received substantial fees for its services, and Kasky retained 
the ability to individually sue other corporations in California as a 
private attorney general under California’s new commercial speech 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2567.  Justice Breyer added that when a political battle is being 
fought, “such plaintiffs potentially constitute a large and hostile crowd freely able 
to bring prosecutions designed to vindicate their beliefs, and to do so 
unencumbered by the legal and practical checks that tend to keep the energies of 
public enforcement agencies focused upon more purely economic harm.”  Id. 
 140. See id. at 2568. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike First Amendment 
Case, supra note 24. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See About Us, FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION, at http://www.fairlabor.org/all/ 
about/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (noting that there are currently 
thirteen leading brand-name participants in the coalition: Adidas-Salomon, Eddie 
Bauer, GEAR for Sports, Gildan Activewear, Liz Claiborne, New Era Cap, 
Nordstrom, Nike, Patagonia, Puma, Reebok, Phillips-Van Heusen, and Zephyr 
Graf-X). 
 145. See Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike First Amendment 
Case, supra note 24. 
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law.146 
V. ANALYSIS: OPPORTUNITY LOST 
By dismissing Nike, the Court lost its opportunity to review and 
potentially overturn the California commercial speech ruling.  It 
also lost the opportunity to declare the California private attorney 
general law unconstitutional.  Perhaps most importantly, the Court 
lost its opportunity to clarify and refine the country’s perplexing 
commercial speech doctrine. 
A.  The California Commercial Speech “Limited Purpose Test”  
Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had not adopted an “all-
purpose” test to distinguish commercial from noncommercial 
speech, the California Supreme Court decided to create its own 
test.147  The court referred to its new test as a “limited purpose test” 
to be used “when a court must decide whether particular speech 
may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or 
other forms of commercial deception.”148  The court took the Bolger 
test and fashioned it to fit its own needs.  Whereas Bolger required 
that the speech in question must be in the form of an 
advertisement, referring to a specific product, and showing that the 
speaker has an economic motivation, the new Kasky test eliminated 
the advertising format requirement, added the element of the 
speaker’s identity, and broadened the definition of products or 
services.149  The resulting three elements became the Kaksy “limited 
purpose test” for commercial speech: (1) There must be a speaker 
engaged in commerce, speaking to (2) an intended audience of 
actual or potential buyers or customers or persons (such as 
reporters or reviewers) likely to repeat the message to or otherwise 
influence actual or potential buyers, stating (3) a commercial 
message representing facts about the business operations, products, 
or services of the speaker, made for the purpose of promoting sales 
of, or other commercial transactions in, the speaker’s products or 
services.150 
Under the Kasky test, product references are deemed to 
 
 146. See Girion, supra note 25, at D10. 
 147. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 311-12. 
 150. See id. 
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include not only statements about price, quality, or availability of 
products, but “statements about the manner in which the products 
are manufactured, distributed, or sold, about repair or warranty 
services that the seller provides to purchasers of the product, or 
about the identity or qualifications of persons who manufacture, 
distribute, sell, service, or endorse the product.”151  References to 
services would include not only statements about the price, 
availability, and quality of the services, but also “statements about 
the education, experience, and qualifications of the persons 
providing or endorsing the services.”152 
This broad definition was necessary, according to the Kasky 
court, to protect consumers from the modern image campaigns, 
which have become a popular vehicle for promoting products and 
services.153  However, as the speech in question did not meet the 
requirements of any of the three existing Supreme Court 
commercial speech tests, it is clear that the California court could 
not find for Kasky without creating a new definition of commercial 
speech.  Certainly, Nike’s speech did more than “propose a 
commercial transaction” (Pittsburgh Press).  It was not speech 
“related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience” (Central Hudson), and it was not in the form of an 
advertisement, nor did it refer to a specific product (Bolger).  
Consequently, the California court could not overturn the lower 
court rulings without devising a new test that cast a much wider net. 
The problem, of course, is that the new Kasky definition of 
commercial speech is so broad that virtually any statement made by 
a corporation will fall under it.  Every business is engaged in 
commerce in some fashion, so every company meets the first 
requirement.  Under Kasky, press releases, newspaper editorials, 
websites, and other forms of communication with the general 
public are deemed to reach prospective buyers, so all 
communications released by a business—no matter how general in 
nature—seem to satisfy Kasky’s second requirement.  In terms of 
commercial content, it is easily argued that everything a company 
does or says is ultimately geared to selling products or services and 
producing revenue for the company.  All corporate speech is 
designed to promote profitability and therefore can be construed 
to satisfy the third requirement of the Kasky limited purpose 
 
 151. Id. at 312. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 312-13. 
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commercial speech test.  Thus, under Kasky, no corporate speaker 
can escape the limited purpose test in any of its public utterances. 
In casting its wide net in a “limited” manner, the California 
court not only expanded its own prior definition of commercial 
speech, but it precluded consideration of Supreme Court cases that 
directly conflict with the Kasky result. Previously, the court had 
defined commercial speech as speech “which has but one 
purpose—to advance an economic transaction.”154  In deciding Kasky, 
the court disapproved that definition as “ill-considered.”155  Further, 
the court was able to circumvent Riley, the seminal case pertaining 
to intermingled speech, as being outside of its own limited purpose 
definition.  In refusing to apply Riley, the court noted that the Riley 
decision “concerned regulation of charitable solicitations, a 
category of speech that does not fit within our limited-purpose 
definition of commercial speech . . . .”156  It would appear, then, 
that the California court purposely fashioned its new definition, at 
least in part, to allow it to reach its desired outcome. 
The broadness of the Kasky “limited purpose test,” alone, is 
very problematic as it relates to First Amendment protections. 
Because the Court also failed to follow precedential Supreme Court 
doctrine and chose to create an unlevel playing field for public 
debate, the result in Kasky does not appear to be viable under the 
First Amendment. 
B.  The California Private Attorney General Law  
Perhaps even more troubling is the matter of California’s 
Unfair Competition Law (UCL), also known as the “private, 
attorney general” law.157  Justice Breyer made it clear in his dissent 
in Nike that using the private attorney general law to press false 
advertising lawsuits could not withstand heightened scrutiny, as 
there is no “reasonable fit” between the government interest served 
by the regulation and the burden it imposes upon speech.158  
The Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC) posed an 
even broader challenge to the UCL in its Nike amicus brief.159  The 
 
 154. See id. at 261. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 260. 
 157. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (allowing actions to be prosecuted 
upon complaint by any person acting for the interests of the general public). 
 158. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2566 (2003). 
 159. Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Justice Association of California, Nike v. Kasky, 
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CJAC maintained that the UCL violates a number of other 
constitutional rights beyond the First Amendment.  Specifically, the 
CJAC explained that the UCL violates due process because it fails 
to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct.160  It also violates 
due process by allowing defendants to be subjected to repeated 
lawsuits for the same conduct.161  Additionally, the UCL 
impermissibly delegates governmental power to private persons,162 
allowing any unelected, unaccountable person to prosecute 
independent of the Attorney General or District Attorney.  Further, 
the UCL permits private persons to sue on federal issues even if the 
federal statute does not allow for private suits, raising a clear issue 
regarding separation of powers.163  The UCL also impermissibly 
imposes its own state law on other states, allowing California to sue 
parties “extraterritorially” under the UCL for acts that are not 
illegal in the states where the conduct occurs.164  Given the 
multitude of potential constitutional violations accorded to the 
UCL, it seems quite remarkable that the law has managed to survive 
in California for the past sixty years. 
The CJAC also appended to its brief a chart detailing the 
reasons why Kasky’s claim would fail under the unfair trade 
practice and/or false advertising laws currently in place in every 
other state.165  The most prominent reason for failure is “no injury” 
or “no likelihood of injury.”166  Other reasons for failing to meet 
 
123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835411 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003). 
 160. Id. at *11-17 (“[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the 
conduct it prohibits . . . .”) (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 
(1966)). 
 161. See id. at *18-21 (“The UCL creates an impermissible risk of repetitive 
punishment because there is no finality to that litigation.  A suit by one plaintiff 
does not prevent another self-appointed ‘private attorney general’ from suing the 
same defendant on precisely the same theory.”). 
 162. See id. at *21-26 (noting that, while states are ordinarily free to determine 
their own standing rules, the UCL “obliterates any semblance of a standing 
requirement—[and] it turns over the machinery of state government to politically 
unaccountable private plaintiffs acting as bounty hunters”). 
 163. See id. at *24 (noting that the UCL also undermines the powers of the 
Executive regarding enforcement of federal law, thus violating Article II, Section 3 
of the U.S. Constitution) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 
(1992)). 
 164. See id. at *26-30 (noting that the UCL extends California law to cover 
“nationwide business conduct”; it authorizes California courts to “punish conduct 
or speech that offends the UCL’s vague provisions no matter where it occurs”). 
 165. Id. at *30. 
 166. See id. 
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state requirements are: no private cause of action, no product 
reference, not a victim, not an actual/potential consumer, no 
purchase, no ascertainable loss of money or property, no reliance, 
representative capacity not allowed, not material, enforcement only 
allowed by Attorney General, no remedy available other than actual 
damages, no prior notice, no causal connection.167 
Under this analysis, the Kasky suit could not have prevailed in 
any state other than California.  Although that fact alone does not 
make the California law bad law, it does give a whole new spin to 
the “caveat emptor” maxim: Buyers and sellers, alike, must 
“beware” when doing business in California. 
Given the plethora of constitutional issues raised by 
commentators, friends of the Court, and the Supreme Court, itself, 
it seems unlikely that the UCL would survive a constitutional 
challenge if the issue were decided on the merits. 
C.  The Perplexing Commercial Speech Doctrine  
In attempting to make sense of the current commercial speech 
doctrine, three particular areas of discussion are of interest: (1) 
reasons for the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech, (2) changes in the world of 
communication and advertising since 1942, and (3) the public’s 
right to receive information. 
1.  Why Is There a Separate Commercial Speech Doctrine? 
Because the Valentine Court provided no reasoned support or 
justification for the commercial speech doctrine at the time of its 
creation, successors have been challenged to make some sense of it.  
Some say that a separate commercial speech category is necessary 
to overcome the danger of “uninformed acquiescence.”168  Others 
justify the need for a distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech based on the need to prevent “commercial 
harm.”169 
The idea of “uninformed acquiescence” encompasses the 
possibility that consumers may respond to false advertisements 
“before there is time for more speech and considered reflection to 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1993) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1978)). 
 169. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993). 
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minimize the risks of being misled.”170  Theoretically, government 
regulation of commercial speech is necessary because it is the only 
way to keep uninformed consumers from being led astray.  The 
antidote, of course, is counterspeech—the dissemination of more 
information to consumers, not less.  Counterspeech is provided by 
competitors, the media, organized consumer groups, politicians, 
and even neighbors conversing over the back fence.  In the new 
age of advertising, where consumers are inundated with 
information regarding product claims and characteristics, 
counterspeech is a powerful influence in protecting consumer 
interests and in assisting consumer decisionmaking.  Modern 
consumers also have access to the Internet, through which they can 
investigate virtually any product claim.  It takes little effort for a 
savvy consumer to become informed on most issues. 
“Commercial harm” is the presumed result of commercial 
speech’s potential to mislead171 and is the “typical reason why 
commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental 
regulation than noncommercial speech.”172  Looking back to the 
birth of the commercial speech doctrine in Valentine, one might 
ask, “Where’s the commercial harm?”  Indeed, the underlying issue 
in Valentine was littering, not speech.  The statute being challenged 
was the New York Sanitary Code, which dictated that handbills 
containing advertising were apparently more unsightly or more apt 
to despoil the city streets than handbills that did not contain 
advertising.  It is unclear how the harm created from distributing a 
commercial handbill would be any greater than the harm from 
distributing a noncommercial handbill.  It is also unclear how a 
statute banning the distribution of commercial handbills but 
allowing the distribution of noncommercial handbills would keep 
the streets free of litter.  If the Valentine case had been heard by the 
Court in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.173 in 1993, the 
 
 170. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  Justice Stevens also notes that “[t]he evils of false commercial 
speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact on commercial 
transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to 
control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this 
speech than of most other speech.”  Id. 
 171. See id. at 494-96 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[F]alse commercial speech can 
be particularly severe: Investors may lose their savings, and consumers may 
purchase products that are more dangerous than they believe or that do not work 
as advertised.”). 
 172. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 426. 
 173. Id. 
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result would have been markedly different. 
In Discovery Network, the City of Cincinnati had granted 
permission to a publisher to place its free promotional magazine in 
a number of city news racks on public property, alongside news 
racks selling various newspapers.174  Subsequently, the city passed an 
ordinance banning the promotional magazines but allowing the 
newspapers to remain.175  The city based its ban on a municipal 
code that prohibited the distribution or sale of “commercial 
handbills” in any public place; the same code specified that it was 
not unlawful to distribute non-commercial handbills.176  The city 
argued that its preferential treatment of newspapers over 
commercial publications permissibly served its interest in “ensuring 
safe streets and regulating visual blight.”177 
The Court disagreed, noting that there was insufficient 
justification to discriminate against the use of a specified category 
of news racks that was no more harmful than the use of the 
permitted news racks.178  Further, the Court stated that the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech “bears 
no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has 
asserted.”179  Because commercial and noncommercial handbills 
were both equally responsible for the “safety concerns and visual 
blight” and because the distinction of commercial versus 
noncommercial speech bore no relationship to the city’s interests, 
the ordinance was “an impermissible means of responding to those 
interests.”180  The city had not asserted an interest in preventing 
commercial harms by regulating the information distributed by 
Discovery Network; therefore, there was no “reasonable fit” 
between the government’s interest and the means of regulation 
employed.181  Consequently, the city’s ordinance against 
commercial handbills was overturned based on the protection 
 
 174. Id. at 412. 
 175. Id. at 413-14. 
 176. Id. at 414. 
 177. Id. at 415. 
 178. See id. at 425 (stating that “[t]he city has asserted an interest in esthetics, 
but respondent publishers’ newsracks are no greater eyesore than the newsracks 
permitted to remain on Cincinnati’s sidewalks.”). 
 179. Id. at 424. 
 180. Id. at 411. 
 181. Id. at 426.  See also id. at 414 (stating that the city had the burden of 
establishing “a reasonable ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means 
chosen to accomplish those ends”) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 
(1989)). 
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afforded by the First Amendment.182 
Given the remarkable similarities between the modern-day 
Discovery Network “commercial handbill” case and its forerunner, 
Valentine, it seems almost certain that the Discovery Network Court 
would have overturned Valentine’s “commercial handbill” ordinance 
based on the same First Amendment protections.  Had the Court 
found for Valentine, the new commercial speech doctrine invented 
by that Court in 1942 would not have materialized.  Perhaps this 
new and lesser-privileged category of speech might have been 
created at some future date, but it seems likely that it would have 
occurred a great deal later and in a more defined form, if at all.  
Given the constitutional vagaries of the commercial speech 
doctrine, one might wonder whether the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech would ever have occurred, 
had it not been for Mr. Valentine and his submarine. 
2.  The Changing World of Advertising 
The Kasky court, in devising a new “limited purpose” definition 
of commercial speech, did raise legitimate concerns regarding 
modern image campaigns.183  The existing commercial speech 
doctrine governing anything other than standard product 
advertising is cloudy at best. “Direct image advertising,” which 
“treats the company as a product,”184 has grown in popularity over 
the years, concurrent with the explosion of advertising through 
multiple modes of modern delivery.  Hundreds of television 
channels, thousands of radio stations, a proliferation of print 
media, the Internet, and even movie theatres offer expanded 
outlets for the avalanche of advertising that descends upon the 
American consumer daily.  With this growth in the industry has 
come considerable change in the methodology and psychology of 
selling products and services.185  Often, the company itself is being 
“sold.”186  Modern examples include the Philip Morris television 
 
 182. Id. at 431. 
 183. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 257 (Cal. 2002) (noting that modern, 
sophisticated public relations campaigns often seek to enhance the image of 
products, the manufacturer, or the seller of the product). 
 184. Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. 
REV. 55, 120 (1999). 
 185. See id. at 124-26 (discussing other modern forms of advertising that are 
difficult to categorize, such as “camouflaged promotion” and “product 
placements”). 
 186. See id. at 119-20 (noting that such advertisements seek merely to project a 
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advertisements touting the various good works of the company (but 
not mentioning its manufacture and sale of cigarettes) or the 
glowing advertisements for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
emphasizing the country’s long, supportive bond and enduring 
friendship with the United States (but not mentioning that fifteen 
of the nineteen September 11th terrorists were Saudi Arabian).187  
As these advertisements are not selling a product, it is unlikely that 
they would be considered “commercial speech” for First 
Amendment purposes.  But aren’t these ads selling something?  
Perhaps what they are selling is inherently political and thereby 
fully protected by the First Amendment.188 
Other companies simply sell their “brand.”189  They don’t 
present specific product information but, rather, a feeling about 
their company, as designated by a memorable symbol, song, or 
catch phrase. (Think “I’d like to teach the world to sing in perfect 
harmony.”  Doesn’t it make you want to reach for a Coke?) Still 
other companies make implied representations about their 
products in their advertising, intimating that whiter teeth (or 
darker hair, or a special shampoo, or a better beer) will endow a 
person with increased sex appeal.190  All of these forms of 
advertising are very different from those of 1942, when Valentine 
was decided, or even from those of 1975, when the modern 
commercial speech doctrine came into being.  Yet, the commercial 
speech doctrine has not changed to accommodate the changing 
times.  In an information age that moves at Mach speed, a judicial 
system that purposely plods and ponders may have difficulty 
keeping up with the pace of commercial evolution. 
 
favorable impression of the sponsoring corporation). 
 187. Saudi Arabia spent more than $17 million on advertising and lobbying in 
the United States after the attacks on September 11, 2001, of which about $16 
million went toward television, radio, and print ads.  According to Saudi officials, 
the ads were designed to “impress upon the American people that Saudis really 
are allies against terror.”  Joe Carey, Since 9/11, Saudis Have Spent Millions on Image 
in U.S., STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Oct. 29, 2003, at A4. 
 188. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 49, at 645-46 (highlighting the earlier 
Philip Morris commercials discussing the importance of the Bill of Rights and 
offering a free copy of the document to anyone requesting one). 
 189. See id. at 639-44 (discussing commercials that don’t “propose a 
transaction” but merely sell brand, or tell a story; noting other commercial forms, 
such as the music video and the “advertorial”). 
 190. See Stern, supra note 184, at 133 (dubbing this type of commercial “The 
Romantic Fallacy”). 
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3.  The Public’s Right to Receive Information 
In attempting to differentiate between commercial speech and 
other types of speech, it has been said that commercial speech is 
constitutionally valued merely as information that does not, itself, 
form part of public discourse.191  If one adheres to this theory, then 
the impact of commercial speech on public opinion occurs only as 
a byproduct of the effort to sell goods.192  In his decision in Virginia 
Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun relied on the words of Alexander 
Meiklejohn to support this idea.193  Meiklejohn argued that 
constitutional protections should focus on “the rights of citizens to 
receive information, rather than on the rights of speakers to 
express themselves.”194  He concluded that “[w]hat is essential is not 
that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be 
said.”195  Commercial speech, then, may be constitutionally 
protected not so much because it relates to the seller’s business, 
but because it furthers “the societal interest in the ‘free flow of 
commercial information.’ ”196  This analysis begs the question of 
how speech can provide information of relevance to public 
decisionmaking without being part of public discourse,197 creating 
yet another fuzzy doctrinal line.  Nonetheless, the Court has 
recognized that the consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information may be “as keen, if not keener by far, than 
his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”198  Thus, both 
the ability to provide commercial information and the opportunity 
to receive commercial information in a free market economy may 
be as important as expression relating to political, artistic, or 
religious matters.199 
Protection of corporate speech rights under the First 
Amendment can therefore be seen as protecting the “public’s right 
of access to information.”200  The free flow of ideas and information 
 
 191. See Post, supra note 73, at 14-15. 
 192. Id. at 13. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960)). 
 196. Id. at 14 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 197. See id. at 15. 
 198. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 763 (1976). 
 199. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 49, at 652. 
 200. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 862 n.7 (2000) (quoting Dan 
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assists the public not only in political decisionmaking but in 
making decisions “significant to the conduct of life.”201  A chilling 
of the process that assists such decisionmaking is harmful not only 
to those providing the information, but also to the public. 
In applying these ideas to the Nike case, it is clear that the 
commercial speech doctrine, formed as it was from nothingness, 
has struggled to keep pace with the changes in modern society 
relating to information flow and economic decisionmaking.  As a 
result of the Nike decision—where state regulation of speech was 
substituted for public scrutiny and counterspeech202—the public 
has been deprived of the information on one side of an important 
public debate.  The information void thus created interferes with 
the consumer’s ability to make political as well as economic 
“buying” decisions, thus disempowering the citizenry of its basic 
First Amendment right of access to information. 
VI. ANALYSIS: IMPACT ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AND MEDIA REPORTING 
A primary concern raised by this potential “chilling effect” on 
the flow of information is that corporations may cut back or 
eliminate reports and publications previously provided to the 
media, corporate social responsibility (CSR) organizations, and 
rating agencies.  Indeed, following the California decision, Nike 
decided to “restrict severely all of its communications on social 
issues that could reach California consumers.”203  Nike ceased 
publishing its annual Corporate Responsibility Report.  
Additionally, Nike decided not to pursue a listing in the Dow Jones 
sustainability index and refused dozens of speaking invitations on 
corporate responsibility topics.204 
European companies SRiMedia and CoreRatings viewed this 
situation with alarm in their amicus brief filed with the U.S. 
Supreme Court on Nike’s behalf.205  The London-based 
 
Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by 
Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1233, 1245-48 
(1991)). 
 201. Id. at 862. 
 202. See Fisher, supra note 15, at 29. 
 203. Nike, Inc., v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2568 (2003). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Brief of Amici Curiae SRiMedia and CoreRatings, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 
S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 836303 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003). 
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companies206—concerned with the potential impact on their ability 
to continue providing corporate responsibility reporting to their 
international community—expressed fear that potential lawsuits in 
California against European companies would deter the corporate 
transparency required to produce their reports.207  The companies 
asserted that the California decision operates in direct opposition 
to the European Union’s movement toward increased corporate 
social responsibility.208  Whereas European governments encourage 
or require businesses to report on social, ethical, and 
environmental issues, the California court’s decision threatens to 
impose liability on any statements made in annual reports or to 
rating agencies that are incomplete or misleading.209  The potential 
imposition of liability in California against a foreign corporation 
raises the possibility that “a European business could be punished 
for complying with its own laws.”210 
Because CSR reporting in the United States is voluntary,211 the 
Nike ruling creates a high level of uncertainty regarding the 
continued availability of CSR data at home as well as abroad.  A 
main concern is that companies may decide it is better to say 
nothing about their CSR practices than to risk “endless battles in 
court.”212  A further concern is that companies with poor social or 
environment records will “hide behind” the California ruling, using 
the decision to prevent publication of any information about their 
practices.213  Indeed, there is concern that, “[f]ollowed to its logical 
conclusion, the ruling would represent the end of social reporting 
 
 206. Id. at *1.  SRiMedia and its affiliates are the largest publishers of 
corporate social responsibility news in Europe; the company says its reports are 
read by European lawmakers and corporate executives of 1200 multinational 
enterprises, as well as by investment analysts of the top 275 financial institutions in 
Europe. CoreRatings reports are used by leading European asset management 
groups to make investment decisions; clients control in excess of $2 trillion in 
investment assets worldwide. Id. 
 207. Id. at *2. 
 208. Id. at *2-3. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at *2. 
 211. See Clarke, supra note 23. 
 212. See id. (quoting Elliott Schrage, Columbia University Law Professor, 
former Senior Vice President of GAP, Inc., and member of the Council on Foreign 
Relations). 
 213. See id. (noting that “[a] substantial risk has arisen out of this case that 
companies will simply stonewall any efforts by CSR stakeholders for information or 
heightened transparency in the CSR policies and procedures”). 
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in America.”214 
Ironically, although increased corporate reporting and 
enhanced transparency are high-profile goals both of the 
international community and of anti-globalization activists, the 
result in Nike seems to stifle such reporting and transparency.  The 
Nike decision provides only “short-term point scoring” through 
penalizing behavior that should be encouraged.215  By refusing to 
foster open debate and a free flow of information, Nike’s 
opponents appear to have acted against the very interests they 
claimed to represent.216 
Concern regarding a depleted information flow as a result of 
the Nike decision also extends to the media and to organized labor.  
The media has expressed concern that it may not be able to 
accurately report on issues of public importance regarding 
corporate America if it receives information on only one side of an 
issue.217  A review of press coverage over the past several years 
demonstrates a “vast array of corporate speech—on issues ranging 
from race discrimination to environmental sustainability to 
personal health and safety—that would now be subject to 
California’s new strict liability dragnet.”218 
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) expressed similar concerns in its amicus 
brief supporting Nike’s First Amendment rights.219  Although the 
AFL-CIO’s support of Nike’s position may seem to fall under the 
heading of “strange bedfellows,” it is clear that organized labor 
cannot debate labor practices if its opponents refuse to speak. The 
AFL-CIO noted that because the majority of Nike’s manufacturing 
facilities were overseas and were merely outsourced operations, the 
 
 214. Mallen Baker, Comment: Nike and Short-sighted Victories in Free Speech, 
ETHICAL CORPORATION ONLINE (Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www.ethicalcorp.com/ 
content_print.asp?ContentID=261 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See Brief of Amici Curiae Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines, 
Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade 
Associations, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 
835613, at *4-6 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) (“Accurate and useful reporting depends on 
considering all sides of an issue . . . . [A]ttaining such a complete picture requires 
newsgatherers to get information not only from interest groups and the company’s 
detractors, but also from the company itself.”). 
 218. Id. at *1. 
 219. Brief of Amicus Curiae AFL-CIO, Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct 2554 
(2003), (No. 02-575) 2003 WL 835038 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2003). 
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labor union could not have learned the locations of the operations 
without receiving the information directly from Nike.220  Nike’s 
cooperation in the sharing of information was therefore 
instrumental to the union’s ability to engage in any type of debate.  
The union is undoubtedly concerned, as well, about the 
implications of placing limits upon Nike’s speech.  If Nike’s speech 
on the issue of labor practices is “commercial,” might not the 
union’s speech on the same issues also be deemed “commercial”?  
As the underlying debate in Nike concerned labor practices, the 
ramifications of the decision, if not reversed, may ultimately have as 
much impact on the speech of organized labor as on the speech of 
corporations. 
The effects of the Nike decision, then, are far-reaching.  Labor 
unions, the media, and CSR organizations alike fear the effects of 
“chilled speech” that the decision may produce.  The impact on 
international corporate responsibility is of paramount concern, as 
the potential deterrence of corporate transparency runs contrary to 
the result that the international community is seeking.  As one 
commentator noted, “the ultimate irony is that [Nike] . . . served 
only to set corporate accountability and transparency back [fifty] 
years.”221 
VII. ANALYSIS: WHAT WAS THE COURT THINKING? 
The U.S. Supreme Court had many options in deciding Nike—
perhaps too many.  Given the growing debate concerning the 
perplexing commercial speech doctrine, it may seem surprising 
that the Court did not take this opportunity to clarify, change, or 
even scrap the doctrine altogether.  On the other hand, given the 
challenge of years of stare decisis as well as the checkered 
precedential value of many of its earlier commercial speech rulings, 
the Court’s decision to decline the task may not seem surprising.  
The Court may have been hesitant merely to issue a narrow 
decision overturning Nike, understanding the larger scope of the 
problem it was being asked to resolve.  There is some speculation 
that the Court had the votes to overturn, but could not agree on 
the underlying doctrinal reasoning.222  There is also speculation 
 
 220. Id. at *16. 
 221. Douglas K. Spong, Golden State Silence: High Court Non-decision Puts Chill on 
Corporate Speech, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), July 21, 2003, available at http:// 
www.prfirms.org/resources/nike/nike072103.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
 222. See Mauro, High Court Appears Ready to Side with Nike, supra note 97 (noting 
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that the Court—with its other high-profile cases absorbing so much 
of its time and energy223—merely ran out of time for Nike.224  
Whatever the reason, the Court opted to disengage itself. 
In his opinion explaining the justification for dismissing the 
writ, Justice Stevens intimated several underlying reasons for not 
attempting to reach a decision.225  First, he indicated that the Court 
did not feel a necessity for deciding the case just then, as the issues 
were too novel and important.226  Second, because of the novelty 
and importance of the case, Justice Stevens felt that the correct 
answer was more likely to result from a full factual record rather 
than from mere unproven allegations.227  Third, Justice Stevens felt 
that the matter was basically a state issue that would benefit from 
“further development below.”228  Overall, the decision seemed to be 
one of judicial efficiency, at least at the U.S. Supreme Court level.229  
Indeed, efficiency was ultimately served, as the case was settled.  
However, justice did not seem to be served, nor was a sense of 
finality provided. 
Justice Stevens’s reasoning did not impress the dissenting 
Justices, who were eager to resolve the First Amendment issues in 
Nike.230  They felt the case could and should have been decided by 
 
that there may not be five votes for one rationale). 
 223. During this session the Court also heard three other closely watched 
cases.  One case involved a Texas anti-sodomy law: Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 
2472 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of 
the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process 
Clause).  The other two cases concerned affirmative action: Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 
S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (holding that the manner in which the University of Michigan 
considered the race of applicants in its undergraduate admissions guidelines 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) 
(holding that the narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions at the 
University of Michigan Law School to further a compelling interest in obtaining 
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by 
the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI). 
 224. See Mauro, Justices Get Nike out of Their Hair, supra note 20 (noting that 
chief Justice Rehnquist is “notorious” for disposing of all pending cases before the 
Court adjourns for the summer, “no matter how ragged or unsatisfying the 
resolution is”). 
 225. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2555-59 (2003). 
 226. Id. at 2558. 
 227. Id. at 2559.  Indeed, Justice Stevens speculated that development of such 
a record might contribute in a positive way to the public debate. Id. 
 228. Id. at 2559. 
 229. See id. at 2557. 
 230. See id. at 2559-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the Court.231  Understanding that the Court’s opportunity to decide 
particular issues comes only infrequently—and perhaps on this 
issue, not again for years—the dissenting Justices felt a sense of 
urgency to act.232  However, the Court did not seem to have the will 
to move forward even when it had the opportunity to do so.233 
The ideological makeup of the Court may provide insight into 
the Court’s inability to act decisively.  The Justices voting to decide 
the case (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer) are purported to be in 
the ideological middle, with Breyer somewhat to the left of center.  
The Justices who voted to dismiss were those thought to be firmly 
to the right of center (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) as well as 
those firmly to the left of center (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter—
though Souter is often a centrist). 
Stevens, who wrote the opinion to dismiss, had been vocal in 
the past regarding the danger of drawing bright lines in the 
commercial speech doctrine.  He often expressed concern, as in his 
concurring opinion in Central Hudson, that commercial speech 
should not be defined too broadly “lest speech deserving of greater 
constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed.”234  Justice 
Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented in Central Hudson, noting 
the substantial state and national interest in the matter of energy 
conservation.235  Justice Rehnquist also expressed his view that “the 
Court unlocked a Pandora’s Box when it ‘elevated’ commercial 
speech to the level of traditional political speech by according it 
First Amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy Board . . . .”236 
Although these opinions were rendered more than twenty 
years ago, it remains of interest that Justice Stevens seemed to 
reside on one end of the commercial speech continuum, favoring a 
narrowing of the commercial speech definition to facilitate a 
broader reading of First Amendment protections, while Justice 
Rehnquist resided on the other end of the continuum, favoring a 
dilution of commercial speech protection and an enhancement of 
the states’ power to regulate speech.237  This divergence of opinion 
 
 231. Id. at 2569. 
 232. See id. at 2560. 
 233. See id. 
 234. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 579 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 235. Id. at 599. 
 236. Id. at 598. 
 237. It is of interest that Justice Rehnquist also dissented in Bigelow, which was 
reaffirmed by Central Hudson.  In Bigelow, Justice Rehnquist noted that the 
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on the basic underpinnings of the commercial speech doctrine may 
go far in explaining why no decision was reached in Nike.  Perhaps 
Justices on the ideological right could not agree with those on the 
ideological left, leaving those in the center to voice their frustration 
over the subsequent inability of the Court to move forward. 
Nonetheless, it takes only five Justices to agree, and it has been 
noted that at least four Justices (Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and 
Thomas) have seemed to be edging toward an alternative approach 
where commercial speech would be protected as “a kind of public 
discourse subject to regulations designed to serve specific state 
interests in preserving ‘a fair bargaining process.’ ”238  Justice 
Thomas, in particular, has been widely quoted in other court 
decisions and commentary as stating that it is nearly impossible to 
sever commercial speech from “speech necessary to democratic 
decisionmaking.”239  For his part, Justice Breyer declared during 
oral arguments in Nike that Nike’s speech was a combination of 
both commercial and noncommercial speech and that Nike was 
trying to contribute to an important public debate as well as to sell 
products.240  He also chided Kasky’s counsel for seeming to indicate 
that consumer protection “trumps the First Amendment.”241 Justice 
O’Connor joined Justice Breyer in the Nike dissent, determining 
that Nike should have been afforded full First Amendment 
protection.242 
It would appear from the writings and recorded arguments of 
the Justices, then, that there would have been at least six votes to 
overturn Nike and to clarify and redefine the commercial speech 
doctrine.  Had the Court decided for Nike, it would likely have 
opted to continue narrowing the gap between commercial and 
noncommercial speech as well.  But history will be silent on the 
matter. Given potential changes in the makeup of the Court, as well 
as the lack of viable cases to challenge the California law, it is 
 
advertisement in question was purely commercial and therefore the state was 
allowed to exercise its legitimate public interest in its regulation.  See Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 832 (1975). 
 238. See Post, supra note 73, at 55 (referring to 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. State of 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1990) (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and 
Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 239. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 240. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 
(2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 21015068 at *58 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2003). 
 241. Id. at *59. 
 242. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2565-68 (2003). 
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unlikely that this Court will have another opportunity to reach a 
satisfactory resolution regarding the issues raised in Nike. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The inability of the Court to reach a decision in Nike has been 
the source of much frustration and concern throughout the world.  
In a globally connected economy where data is transmitted 
instantaneously with the click of an icon, a remarkable volume of 
information is continuously available to consumers everywhere.  
Once a press release or other data hits the free Web services, it 
achieves “digital immortality.”243  This means “perpetual exposure” 
for any type of information distributed by a corporation.244 
The challenge for the U.S. court system is to determine how 
best to protect consumers from invalid or even fraudulent speech, 
while still allowing the free flow of information—commercial or 
otherwise—to continue.  In a world where advertising has become 
more of an artform than a direct proposal to do business,245 the job 
becomes much more complicated.  However, the difficulty of the 
task does not justify an unwillingness to undertake it.  The Court 
should have decided the Nike case.  It should have sought judicial 
efficiency not by dismissing the writ, but by making a decision.  It 
should have provided clarity to the muddled commercial speech 
doctrine.  And, most importantly, it should have provided certainty 
to corporations around the world that wish to participate in the 
social, political, and economic discourse of the times without fear 
of endless, costly litigation in a remote state where no harm has 
been alleged. 
Only time will tell if the predictions of a broader “chilling” of 
corporate speech will occur as a result of Nike.  In the interim, the 
business community faces the possibility that the government may 
now use the commercial speech doctrine as a weapon to limit or 
even suppress unwelcome speech.  Should the Court again have an 
opportunity to review the California law, it must not stumble or 
hesitate; instead, it must “Just Do It!” 
 
 
 243. See Graulich, supra note 18, at D12. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Fisher, supra note 15, at 31. 
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